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Note
CLASS V. UNITED STATES: AN IMPERFECT APPLICATION OF
THE MENNA-BLACKLEDGE DOCTRINE TO POST-GUILTY
PLEA CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
NIKOLAUS ALBRIGHT ∗
In Class v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court addressed whether an
unconditional guilty plea bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging
the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. 2 Although
an unconditional guilty plea does waive some constitutional claims, 3 the
Court ruled that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s ability to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such a claim
falls within the Menna-Blackledge exception. 4 The Court correctly held
that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applies to claims that challenge the
constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such claims challenge
the government’s power to constitutionally convict a defendant. 5 The
Court’s holding is consistent with its ruling in United States v. Broce 6 because Class’s claim did not contradict the conduct admitted in his guilty
plea, and the Court’s holding is compatible with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure because the text of the Rule does not require a
© 2019 Nikolaus Albright.
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author would like to thank his editors, Alexandra Botsaris, Caroline Covington, Sarah Samaha, and
Meredith Storm, for their invaluable feedback, suggestions, and patience throughout the writing
process. The author also thanks his faculty advisors, Professor Lee Kovarsky and Professor David
Gray, for their insight. The author dedicates this Note to his parents, Jim and Denise Albright, for
their love and wholehearted support of each and every one of his endeavors.
1. 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).
2. Id. at 803.
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2). The Rule states:
Conditional Plea. With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may
enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right to
have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion.
A defendant who prevails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.
Id.
4. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805–06.
5. See infra Section IV.A.
6. 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
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defendant to reserve a constitutional challenge through a conditional plea. 7
Additionally, the Court’s holding was appropriate because Rule 11(a)(2)
alone does not provide adequate procedural safeguards for defendants as
they enter their plea, 8 and the Court properly balanced the defendant’s interest in asserting constitutional values and in being free from punishment
against the government’s interests in maintaining the finality of convictions
and conserving resources. 9 The Court, however, failed to promote uniformity in the federal circuits by not addressing the current circuit split on
the issue and by neglecting to adopt a clear rule of law. 10
In Part I, this Note will summarize the factual and procedural background leading to the Court’s opinion. 11 Part II will explore the roots of
guilty plea jurisprudence 12 and the historical development of guilty pleas as
a waiver of constitutional claims on appeal. 13 Part III will explain the reasoning underlying the Court’s decision. 14 Finally, Part IV of this Note will
(1) assert that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine is applicable to Class’s claims
and is consistent with the Court’s holding in Broce; 15 (2) contend that the
Court’s holding is consistent with Rule 11; 16 (3) argue that Rule 11(a)(2)
alone inadequately protects defendants’ procedural rights; 17 (4) maintain
that the Court properly balanced the parties’ competing interests; 18 and (5)
demonstrate that the Court failed to promote uniformity in the federal circuits. 19
I. THE CASE
In September 2013, a federal grand jury indicted petitioner Rodney
Class for possessing firearms in his parked vehicle on the grounds of the
United States Capitol in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e). 20 Appearing pro
se, Class asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute of conviction violated the
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); see infra Section IV.B.
8. See infra Section IV.C.
9. See infra Section IV.D.
10. See infra Section IV.E.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section II.B–D.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Section IV.A.
16. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See infra Section IV.C.
18. See infra Section IV.D.
19. See infra Section IV.E.
20. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; see 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (2012) (“An individual . . . may not
carry on or have readily accessible . . . on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm . . . .”).
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Second Amendment and the absence of fair notice that weapons were
banned in the parking lot denied him due process. 21 The district court rejected both claims and denied Class’s motion to dismiss the indictment. 22
After the district court’s ruling, Class pleaded guilty to the charges
against him and entered into a written plea. 23 The plea agreement included
five categories of expressly waived rights and three categories of claims
that were not waived, 24 but it failed to mention the right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute of conviction. 25 Additionally, the plea agreement stated: “No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations
have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in
writing herein, nor will any such agreements . . . be made unless committed
to writing and signed . . . .” 26 The district court reviewed the terms of the
plea agreement with Class to ensure the validity of the plea, accepted his
guilty plea, and sentenced him to twenty-four days of imprisonment with
twelve months of supervised release. 27
Soon thereafter, Class appealed his conviction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and repeated his Second Amendment and Due Process Clause claims. 28 The D.C. Circuit held
that “Class could not raise his constitutional claims because, by pleading
guilty, he had waived them.” 29 In its decision, the D.C. Circuit noted that
instead of reserving the right to appeal his conviction by entering a conditional guilty plea, Class entered an unconditional plea. 30 The court listed
21. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; see U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
22. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
23. Id.
24. Id. The expressly waived categories of rights included:
(1) all defenses based upon the statute of limitations; (2) several specified trial rights;
(3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined, maximum sentencing guideline range; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence; and
(5) various rights to request or receive information concerning the investigation and
prosecution of [Class’s] criminal case.
Id. The expressly enumerated claims that Class could raise on appeal included “claims based upon (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) certain statutes
providing for sentence reductions.” Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. During the Rule 11 plea inquiry, the district court judge asked Class: “Now, by pleading guilty, you would be generally giving up your rights to appeal. Do you understand that?”
United States v. Class, No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016). Class
responded, “Yes.” Id.
28. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802.
29. Id. at 803.
30. United States v. Class, No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016);
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (providing the option for defendants to enter into a conditional
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two exceptions to the general rule that an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all constitutional claims: “‘the defendant’s claimed right
not to be haled into court at all,’ and a claim ‘that the court below lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.’” 31 The D.C. Circuit, without any
explanation, stated that neither of the exceptions applied to Class’s claims. 32
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted Class’s petition for
certiorari to decide “whether in pleading guilty a criminal defendant inherently waives the right to challenge the constitutionality of his statute of
conviction.” 33
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The acceptance of guilty pleas is prevalent in the criminal justice system. 34 Their popularity is likely due to the “mutuality of advantage” that
both defendants and the government enjoy by entering into a plea agreement. 35 Defendants have the advantage of reducing their probable sentence,
while the government has the advantage of conserving judicial and prosecutorial resources. 36 A guilty plea, however, constitutes a waiver of some important constitutional rights. 37 Yet, a guilty plea does not waive all rights;
there are certain fundamental rights that “exist beyond the confines of the
trial” that, if violated, render the defendant’s plea and conviction invalid. 38
Section II.A discusses early common law recognition that a guilty plea is
not a waiver of all claims on appeal. Section II.B examines the Supreme
Court’s shift toward shielding guilty pleas as demonstrated in a trilogy of
cases—Brady v. United States, 39 McMann v. Richardson, 40 and Parker v.
North Carolina 41 (“the Brady trilogy”)—and the reaffirmation of the general rule that a voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty plea constitutes a
waiver of all claims on appeal. Section II.C examines the exceptions the
guilty plea and reserve “the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a
specified pretrial motion”).
31. Class, 2016 WL 10950032, at *2 (quoting United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d
1337, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
32. Id.
33. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803.
34. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (noting that “[n]inety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas”).
35. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
36. Id.
37. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805 (noting that a guilty plea waives the privilege against selfincrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront accusers (citing McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969))).
38. Id. (quoting and citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 324 (1999)); see infra
Section II.A–C.
39. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
40. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
41. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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Supreme Court subsequently carved out of the general rule in Blackledge v.
Perry 42 and Menna v. New York. 43 Lastly, Section II.D explores the circuit
split that resulted from the inconsistent development of the law in the federal circuits in applying the aforementioned exceptions.
A. Early Common Law Recognition That a Guilty Plea Is Not a Waiver
of All Claims
A guilty plea entails a judgment of conviction that precludes subsequent litigation, as would any other judgment absent a plea of guilty. Cases
addressing the preclusive effect of guilty pleas date as far back as the
1800s. 44 In Commonwealth v. Hinds, 45 one of the first cases to discuss the
preclusive effect of guilty pleas, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed whether a guilty plea has a preclusive effect on a defendant’s claim that the indictment failed to state a crime. 46 The court held that
the guilty plea was not a confession of any crime because the facts admitted
in the indictment failed to allege any conduct proscribed by law. 47 The defendant’s conviction was discharged despite entering a guilty plea because
he pleaded guilty to something that did not constitute a crime. 48
The principle that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all claims on appeal
has been reiterated countless times since it appeared in Hinds. Shortly after
Hinds, in Carper v. State, 49 the Supreme Court of Ohio was faced with deciding whether a guilty plea precludes a defendant’s claim that the indictment failed to state an offense.50 The court went beyond Hinds and held
that despite pleading guilty, a defendant may object to the court’s or grand
jury’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim in addition to asserting that the indictment defectively failed to state an offense. 51 In Klawanski
v. People, 52 the Supreme Court of Illinois faced the same issue presented in
Hinds and reached the same conclusion: If the indictment fails to allege a
crime, a guilty plea does not constitute a confession to a crime because, by

42. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
43. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
44. See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209 (1869) (discussing the preclusive effect of
guilty pleas in the late 1800s); Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572 (1875) (discussing the right to objection, in certain circumstances, for defendants who pleaded guilty); United States v. Bayaud, 16
F. 376, 382 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) (noting that post-guilty plea defendants may still claim that the
indictment failed to allege the acts intended to be proved).
45. 101 Mass. 209 (1869).
46. Id. at 209–10.
47. Id. at 211.
48. Id. at 210.
49. 27 Ohio St. 572 (1875).
50. Id. at 575.
51. Id.
52. 218 Ill. 481 (1905).
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pleading guilty, the defendant merely admits to what is alleged in the indictment. 53
Although there is a lack of Supreme Court precedent on the preclusive
effect of guilty pleas at this point in history, the federal circuits began to
recognize the general rule that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all claims on
appeal shortly after the aforementioned state cases. In Hocking Valley
Railway Co. v. United States, 54 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit addressed whether a defendant may claim that the indictment
failed to state an offense after entering a plea of nolo contendere. 55 The
court, recognizing Hinds and Carper as support for its decision, held that a
plea of nolo contendere should not bar such a claim because it is settled law
that a defendant may bring such a claim after pleading guilty. 56 The court
refused to make a distinction between a plea of nolo contendere and an outright guilty plea for purposes of the asserted claim and reasoned that a plea
of nolo contendere did not bar the defendant’s claim because a guilty plea
does not foreclose the claim. 57 Years after the Sixth Circuit’s holding, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went beyond Hocking Valley Railway Co. in United States v. Ury 58 and directly held that the
defendant’s guilty plea did not preclude him from claiming that both the indictment failed to state an offense and the statute was unconstitutional. 59
These cases illustrate the principle that a guilty plea is not a waiver of all
claims on appeal is rooted in early guilty plea jurisprudence.
When the Supreme Court was finally confronted with a defendant’s
post-guilty plea Fifth Amendment challenge to the statute of conviction in
Haynes v. United States, 60 the Court accepted the same principle that appeared in Hinds nearly 100 years prior. The Court held that the guilty plea
did not waive Haynes’ constitutional claim of privilege against self-

53. Id. at 484 (“By a plea of guilty the accused simply confesses that he is guilty in manner
and form as charged in the indictment, and if the indictment charges no criminal offense, or is otherwise fatally defective, it may be subsequently attacked on that ground.”).
54. 210 F. 735 (6th Cir. 1914).
55. Id. at 738. A plea of nolo contendere is a plea of no contest “by which a defendant does
not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for
purposes of the case to treat [them] as if [they] were guilty.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 35 (1970).
56. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 210 F. at 739 (“It seems to be the settled rule that, even after
explicit plea of guilty, defendant may urge, in the reviewing court, such an objection.” (citing
Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572 (1875); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209 (1869))).
57. Id. at 738–39 (“[W]e are satisfied that the plea of nolo contendere should not be construed as a waiver of a right which the plea of guilty does not waive.”).
58. 106 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939).
59. Id. at 28 (“The questions presented put in issue whether the statute is constitutional and
whether the information charged a crime. The plea of guilty did not foreclose the appellant from
the review he now seeks.” (citing Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 210 F. at 738–39)).
60. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
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incrimination. 61 The Court did not provide any explanation for allowing the
constitutional claim, only noting that it is assumed that a guilty plea would
not bar a constitutional claim on appeal. 62
B. The Brady Trilogy: The Supreme Court’s Shift Toward Shielding
Guilty Pleas
In 1970, the Supreme Court departed from the long-recognized view
of guilty pleas and shifted toward “insulating all guilty pleas from subsequent attack” 63 in the series of cases known as the Brady trilogy. 64 In each
of these cases, the Court grounded its reasoning in the presumed validity of
voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty pleas. 65 In all three cases, the
Court held that a post-guilty plea defendant may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea because an otherwise valid guilty
plea bars all claims on appeal. 66
Both Brady v. United States and Parker v. North Carolina examined
charges brought under the Federal Kidnapping Act, 67 which at the time allowed a death sentence if a jury recommended such punishment. 68 Two
years prior to Brady and Parker, the death penalty provision of the Federal
Kidnapping Act was ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson 69
because the death penalty discouraged defendants from asserting their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to not plead guilty and
from asserting their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. 70 Defendants
charged under the Act could avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty because only a jury, not a judge, could sentence the defendant to death. 71
In Brady, the petitioner faced the death penalty and pleaded guilty under the Federal Kidnapping Act at issue in Jackson. 72 In light of the Court’s
recent invalidation of the death penalty provision, Robert Brady claimed his
pre-Jackson guilty plea was involuntary because it was coerced by the risk

61. Id. at 87 n.2.
62. Id. (“Petitioner’s plea of guilty did not, of course, waive his previous claim of the constitutional privilege.”).
63. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 775 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 262, 265 (1973) (referring to Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970) as the Brady trilogy).
65. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747.
66. Id.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012).
68. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743.
69. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
70. Id. at 581.
71. Id. (noting that the death penalty was “applicable only to those defendants who assert the
right to contest their guilt before a jury”).
72. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743.
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of receiving the death penalty. 73 The Court emphasized the general rule
that voluntarily and intelligently entered guilty pleas are valid.74 The Court
found that even if Brady only pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty, the
plea was voluntary nonetheless because a desire to avoid the death penalty
does not prove that the plea was a coerced and involuntary act.75 Additionally, the Court noted that the plea was intelligent because he was advised by
a competent attorney under the then-existing law. 76 Having established
Brady’s guilty plea met the validity requirements of the general rule, the
Court held that his plea was still valid in light of Jackson because a valid
guilty plea made in consideration of the then-applicable law is not impugned by a defendant not expecting a change in the law. 77 Thus, newly
established law does not affect the validity of a voluntarily and intelligently
entered guilty plea. 78 Brady effectively established that the only way to disturb a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea is to successfully claim that the guilty plea was involuntarily or unintelligently entered. 79 The Court’s justification lies in its characterization of a guilty plea
as not merely admitting past conduct, but also as consenting to judgment of
conviction without a trial. 80
In Parker, Charles Parker faced the death penalty and pleaded guilty
under a North Carolina first-degree burglary statute. 81 The North Carolina
statutory framework was equivalent to the death penalty provision invalidated by the Court in Jackson. 82 Parker, like Brady, claimed his plea was
involuntary in light of the Jackson decision because it was induced by the
risk of receiving the death penalty. 83 The Court conceded that under Jackson, it may have been unconstitutional to impose the death penalty under
the North Carolina statutory framework at the time of Parker’s plea. 84 The
Court, however, reiterated the principle from Brady that an otherwise valid
plea is not coerced and involuntary simply because a defendant wanted to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty. 85 Finding Parker’s case indistinguishable from Brady’s case on this issue, the Court held that Parker’s plea
73. Id. at 745–46.
74. Id. at 747.
75. Id. at 750.
76. Id. at 756.
77. Id. at 757 (“The fact that Brady did not anticipate United States v. Jackson . . . does not
impugn the truth or reliability of his plea.”).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 748.
80. Id.
81. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792–93 (1970); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1
(1965) (repealed 1971).
82. Parker, 397 U.S. at 794–95.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 795; see supra text accompanying notes 73–75.
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could not be attacked because it was voluntarily and intelligently entered
under the then-existing law. 86
In the last case of the Brady trilogy, the Court reinforced its protection
of guilty pleas in McMann v. Richardson, which involved three defendants
who confessed and ultimately pleaded guilty to several criminal offenses in
New York. 87 On appeal, each of the defendants claimed their guilty pleas
were the result of coerced confessions and, therefore, were involuntary and
invalid. 88 The defendants relied on the Court’s decision in Jackson v. Denno, 89 which held that the New York procedure for determining voluntariness of a confession—the procedure that would have applied to the
McMann defendants if they decided to go to trial—was unconstitutional. 90
The New York procedure required trial judges, when a defendant offered a
confession and a prima facie case of voluntariness had been established, to
submit the issue of voluntariness of a confession to the jury without the
judge independently resolving factual issues and determining whether the
confession was voluntary. 91 In Denno, the Court held that the procedure
was unconstitutional because it did not afford a reliable determination of
voluntariness and did not protect a defendant’s right to be free of conviction
upon a coerced confession. 92
The decision in Denno was applied retroactively to defendants convicted at trial under the New York Procedures in place prior to Denno,
which granted such defendants an additional hearing on the voluntariness of
their confession. 93 The McMann defendants argued that they were likewise
entitled to challenge the voluntariness of their confession because their coerced confession caused them to plead guilty prior to Denno. 94 In rejecting
the defendants’ claims, the Court drew a distinction between coerced confessions that result in conviction after trial and those that result in a guilty
plea. 95 A conviction after trial in which a coerced confession is introduced
as evidence rests in part on the coerced confession, which the Court asserted is an unconstitutional basis for conviction. 96 When defendants plead
guilty, however, they are convicted based on their admission that they

86. Id. (noting that the Court “see[s] nothing to distinguish Parker’s case from Brady’s” with
regard to this issue).
87. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 761–64 (1970).
88. Id.
89. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
90. McMann, 397 U.S. at 765 (noting that prior to Denno, “constitutionally acceptable procedures were unavailable to a defendant to test the voluntariness of his confession”).
91. Id. at 772.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 773.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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committed the crime charged in the indictment—any prior coerced confession is not the basis for the conviction and has never been used as evidence
in trial. 97 The Court held that regardless of the holding reached in Denno,
the validity of a guilty plea still turns on the voluntary and intelligent nature
of the plea. 98 The validity of a defendant’s plea remains unaffected even if
the counseled advice would have been different after Denno.99
The Court reaffirmed its Brady trilogy holdings when it addressed
whether a guilty plea bars a claim of unconstitutional jury selection on appeal in Tollett v. Henderson. 100 In Tollett, the defendant was indicted by a
grand jury for first-degree murder. 101 On the advice of his attorney, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment. 102 The defendant later petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming for the
first time that his grand jury was unconstitutionally selected because of the
systematic exclusion of Black Americans from the jury panel. 103 The Court
found the Brady trilogy was controlling because, like each of the defendants
in the Brady trilogy, the defendant in Tollett alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right that occurred prior to entry of the guilty plea.104 In the
Brady trilogy, the issue was not the merits of the constitutional claims, but
whether the pleas were voluntarily and intelligently entered with the advice
of competent counsel. 105 Because the guilty pleas in the Brady trilogy foreclosed inquiry into the antecedent constitutional violations, the Court found
that the guilty plea in Tollett likewise foreclosed inquiry into the grand jury
selection claim. 106 The Court held that when a defendant admits guilt of the
crime charged, they cannot thereafter raise claims concerning the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the guilty plea—a defendant may only attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea.107 Tollett’s claim that the grand jury that indicted him was unconstitutionally
selected was thus barred because it occurred prior to the entry of his guilty
97. Id. (“He is convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the
crime charged against him. The prior confession is not the basis for the judgment, has never been
offered in evidence at trial, and may never be offered in evidence.”).
98. Id. at 772.
99. Id. at 773.
100. 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).
101. Id. at 259.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 265. In Tollett, the defendant claimed the grand jury that indicted him before he
pleaded guilty was unconstitutionally selected. In McMann, each of the defendants claimed their
prior confessions were coerced. Lastly, in Brady and Parker, the defendants claimed the death
penalty provisions of their statutes of conviction placed an impermissible burden on their constitutional rights. Id.
105. Id. at 266.
106. Id. The Court reiterated “the principle recognized in the Brady trilogy: a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Id. at 267.
107. Id. at 267.
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plea. 108 The Court’s holding in Tollett, therefore, bolstered and reaffirmed
the Brady trilogy’s theme of barring post-guilty plea constitutional challenges.
C. The Menna-Blackledge Doctrine: Exceptions to the General Rule
After Tollett, the Supreme Court shifted away from its practice of
foreclosing post-guilty plea claims. The Court carved out two exceptions to
the general rule that guilty pleas constitute a waiver of all claims on appeal
in Blackledge v. Perry 109 and Menna v. New York. 110 The BlackledgeMenna Court held that claims involving “the right not to be haled into court
at all” 111 and the state’s power to constitutionally prosecute the charge are
not waived by a guilty plea.112 If the state lacks the power to constitutionally prosecute a defendant, the Court reasoned, the initiation of proceedings
against them denies the defendant due process of law. 113 These exceptions
are recognized by and imported into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 114
In Blackledge, the Court addressed whether a defendant’s guilty plea
barred their due process and double jeopardy claims. 115 In holding that the
guilty plea was not a waiver of those claims, the Court ruled that the case at
bar was distinct from Tollett and the Brady trilogy. 116 The Court stated that
although the claims in Tollett and the Brady trilogy were “of constitutional
dimensions, none went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant
into court to answer the charge brought against him.” 117 Additionally, unlike Tollett, the defendant did not complain about a deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the guilty plea, but rather asserted “the
right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.” 118 Thus, a de-

108. Id. at 269.
109. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
110. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
111. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30.
112. Menna, 423 U.S. at 63 n.2.
113. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30–31.
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments (explaining
that Rule 11(a)(2) has “no application” to situations like those in Blackledge and Menna where
claims may be raised after a guilty plea, and that Rule 11(a)(2) “should not be interpreted as either
broadening or narrowing the Menna-Blackledge doctrine or as establishing procedures for its application”). Rule 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to “enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . reserving in
writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial
motion.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
115. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 23.
116. Id. at 30.
117. Id. (explaining the defendants in McMann “could . . . have been brought to trial without
the use of the . . . coerced confessions” and “a tainted indictment,” like the one in Tollett, “could
have been ‘cured’ through a new indictment by a properly selected grand jury”).
118. Id.
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fendant has a right to claim that the state lacked the power to constitutionally prosecute them because a guilty plea is invalid and meaningless if the
state was without such power. 119
In Menna, the Supreme Court decided whether a guilty plea waived a
defendant’s right to appeal based on a double jeopardy claim. 120 In holding
that Steve Menna’s claim was not barred, the Court noted neither Tollett,
Brady, or McMann “stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably waive all antecedent constitutional violations.” 121 Rather, the point
was that a valid guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt that removes the
issue of factual guilt from the case. 122 Because the claim in Menna was that
the State may not convict the defendant “no matter how validly his factual
guilt is established,” the guilty plea did not bar the claim. 123 Even if everything admitted in the indictment is true, the guilty plea is invalid if the state
lacks the constitutional power to convict the defendant upon the charge in
the indictment. 124
The Menna-Blackledge doctrine remained untouched by the Supreme
Court for almost fifteen years until United States v. Broce. 125 In Broce, the
Court addressed another double jeopardy claim, which each defendant made
after they pleaded guilty to indictments for two separate conspiracies.126
Though the Court acknowledged the Menna-Blackledge exception to the
rule prohibiting a collateral attack on a guilty plea, it reasoned that the exception had no application to the case at bar. 127 The Court emphasized that
Menna added an important qualification to the exception; the rule only applies when, “judged on its face,” the government may not constitutionally
prosecute the charge. 128 The Court reasoned that the Menna-Blackledge
doctrine was inapplicable because unlike the defendants in Blackledge and
Menna, the Broce defendants could not prove their claim without contra119. Id. at 30–31 (noting “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] in the
Superior Court thus operated to deny him due process of law”).
120. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
121. Id. at 62 n.2 (noting in Tollett, the Court emphasized that “waiver was not the basic ingredient of [McMann and Brady]”).
122. Id. (“The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual
guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual
guilt from the case.”). The Court also noted, “[i]n most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for
the State’s imposition of punishment,” so a guilty plea “simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt.” Id.
123. Id. The Court specified that it “[did] not hold that a double jeopardy claim may never be
waived. [The Court] simply [held] that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—
judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Id.
124. Id.
125. 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
126. Id. at 565.
127. Id. at 574.
128. Id. at 575. (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (emphasis added)).
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dicting their indictments and venturing beyond the existing record. 129
Broce thus expressly narrowed the Menna-Blackledge exception by recognizing that Menna impliedly required that the claim must be proved by relying on the existing record. 130
D. Development of the Law in the Federal Circuits and the Circuit
Split
Following Blackledge, Menna, and Broce, an inconsistent application
of the law resulted in a federal circuit split. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit differ from the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. and Tenth Circuit in their application of
Broce’s holding to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine. 131 More significantly,
absent any guidance from the Supreme Court since Broce, most circuits
have developed an analysis distinct from that of the Supreme Court for determining whether a guilty plea bars a certain claim on appeal. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit, an important distinction is
made between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims. 132 Of these circuits, all but the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit further distinguish between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges in determining whether a claim is jurisdictional, but not all of the circuits are in agreement on
that issue.133
1. The Inconsistent Application of Broce
The Sixth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit have relied on the MennaBlackledge doctrine either without mentioning Broce or have treated
Broce’s holding as equivalent to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine. For example, in United States v. Skinner, 134 the Sixth Circuit cited Blackledge as
its sole support for holding that a guilty plea did not bar the defendant’s
claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutionally vague. 135 Likewise, in United States v. Knowles, 136 the Fifth Circuit held that a claim that
129. Id. at 575–76 (explaining “[i]n Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant’s
guilty plea were simply irrelevant, because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in
the State’s power to bring any indictment at all,” and in Menna, “the indictment was facially duplicative of the earlier offense . . . so that the admissions made by Menna’s guilty plea could not
conceivably be construed to extend beyond a redundant confession to the earlier offense”).
130. Id.
131. See infra Section II.D.1.
132. See infra Section II.D.2.
133. See infra Section II.D.3.
134. 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994).
135. Id. at 1317 (“[F]ollowing a guilty plea, a defendant [can] raise on appeal that he was
prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute.” (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974))).
136. 29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the statute of conviction was unconstitutional was not barred pursuant to
Menna. 137 In United States v. Seay, 138 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged
Broce’s existence in its analysis but treated Broce as equivalent to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine by only citing to Broce in conjunction with Blackledge and Menna. 139 Each of these circuits did not consider the limitation
that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine in their analyses. 140
In contrast, the D.C. and Tenth Circuit expressly base their holdings on
the limitation that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine. In
United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 141 the D.C. Circuit held that the MennaBlackledge exception did not apply to Jose Delgado-Garcia’s claim. 142 Citing Broce, the court determined that there was no facial constitutional defect in the indictment. 143 The claim was thus barred because an assessment
of Delgado-Garcia’s claim would have required the court to look beyond
the facts in the indictment. 144 The Tenth Circuit used Broce to establish a
much more narrow view of the Menna-Blackledge doctrine in United States
v. De Vaughn. 145 In De Vaughn, the court explained that Blackledge and
Menna created exceptions for two types of claims: “claims that the Due
Process Clause prevents the state from bringing a greater charge and claims
that an indictment is ‘facially duplicative of [an] earlier offense.’”146 Based
on this interpretation of Broce, the court held that a claim that the statute of
conviction is unconstitutional does not fall within the Menna-Blackledge
exception and is foreclosed by a guilty plea. 147
2. Jurisdictional and Non-Jurisdictional Claims
The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit distinguish between jurisdictional and non137. Id. at 952 (“[It is well-established] that a guilty plea does not waive the right of the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he is convicted.” (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62–63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam)).
138. 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
139. Id. at 921, 923 (“[Seay] alleges that the indictment should never have been brought at all
because the government ‘may not constitutionally prosecute’ him. If Seay is correct, then he
should never have been ‘haled into court’ at all . . . . Such challenges to the court’s jurisdiction
may be pursued despite a defendant’s guilty plea.” (first quoting Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2; then
quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30; then citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575
(1989))).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 129–130.
141. 374 F.3d 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
142. Id. at 1343.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 694 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2012).
146. Id. at 1152 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575).
147. Id. at 1154 (“Neither Blackledge nor Menna involved claims that a criminal statute violated the Constitution. Rather, the defendants in those cases alleged that bringing any charges,
even charges based on valid statutes, violated due process or double jeopardy.”).
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jurisdictional claims when assessing the validity of a claim on appeal. “The
term ‘jurisdictional’ refers to a court’s statutory or constitutional authority
to hale the defendant into court.” 148 Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, makes no reference to the jurisdictional nature of a post-guilty plea
claim. 149 The general rule in the above-mentioned circuits is that a guilty
plea waives the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues, including constitutional claims. 150 Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty may only bring
jurisdictional claims on appeal.151
To illustrate, in Skinner, Rodney Skinner pleaded guilty to possession
and distribution of obscene matter and later appealed, claiming that the statute of conviction was unconstitutionally vague. 152 After reiterating the general rule that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, the Sixth
Circuit asserted that a vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect because
it challenges the government’s authority to constitutionally prosecute a defendant under the statute. 153 As a result, Skinner’s guilty plea did not foreclose his vagueness challenge. 154
In United States v. Whited, 155 Ruth Whited pleaded guilty to embezzling money from a healthcare provider. 156 On appeal, the defendant
claimed the indictment was insufficient, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the statute of conviction was unconstitutional as-applied to
her. 157 The Third Circuit concluded that each of Whited’s claims challenged the court’s jurisdiction and were not barred because she could not be
constitutionally prosecuted if any of her claims were true. 158
In United States v. Brown, 159 Bud Ray Brown pleaded guilty to attempted escape from a county jail and appealed, claiming lack of jurisdiction on the basis that he was not in federal custody at the time of the attempt. 160 After stating the general rule that a guilty plea does not bar
148. United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A jurisdictional issue is one
that stands in the way of conviction—even when factual guilt is validly established—and prevents
a court from entering any judgment in the case . . . .”).
149. See De Vaughn, 694 F.3d at 1152 (recognizing the Supreme Court does not “speak in
terms of jurisdiction”); see also supra Section II.A–C (discussing Supreme Court cases that
demonstrate the Court does not base its decisions on the jurisdictional nature of claims).
150. Phillips, 645 F.3d at 862 (“As a general rule, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his
right to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues.”).
151. Id.
152. United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1315 (6th Cir. 1994).
153. Id. at 1317 (“Although a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects . . . a vagueness
challenge is a jurisdictional defect.”).
154. Id.
155. 311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2002).
156. Id. at 260.
157. Id. at 262.
158. Id.
159. 875 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2017).
160. Id. at 1237, 1238.
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jurisdictional claims, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Brown’s claim was not
barred because a claim involving the legal status of custody challenges the
government’s jurisdiction. 161
Likewise, in United States v. Saac, 162 four defendants pleaded guilty to
knowingly conspiring to operate and intentionally “operating and embarking in a semi-submersible vessel without nationality, with the intent to
evade detection in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2285(a) and (b).” 163 The defendants claimed that their statute of conviction was unconstitutional. 164
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendants’ challenge was a jurisdictional issue not waived upon pleading guilty because even if the defendants were factually guilty, the government would lack the power to prosecute them if the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.165
3. Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges
Apart from the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit, the federal circuits
that speak in terms of jurisdiction further distinguish between facial and asapplied constitutional challenges to determine whether a claim is waived on
appeal. Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, does not make any such
distinction. 166 The general rule in this group of circuits is that a guilty plea
waives the right to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge because it is
a non-jurisdictional claim, but a defendant can bring a facial constitutional
challenge because it is jurisdictional. 167
In United States v. Phillips, 168 Michael Phillips pleaded guilty to illegal removal and disposal of asbestos. 169 For the first time on appeal, the defendant claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
him. 170 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the general rule that a
post-guilty plea defendant waives the right to appeal all non-jurisdictional
claims and then stated that an as-applied challenge is not jurisdictional. 171
The court reasoned that a facially vague statute is jurisdictional because it is
161. Id. at 1238–39 (“Brown’s claim involving the legal status of his custody challenges the
government’s power to bring the indictment ‘at the time the plea was entered on the basis of the
existing record.’” (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989))).
162. 632 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2011).
163. Id. at 1207.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1208.
166. See supra Section II.A–C (discussing Supreme Court cases that illustrate the lack of a
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges).
167. United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hile a facial vagueness
challenge is jurisdictional, an as-applied vagueness challenge is non-jurisdictional and waived unless specifically reserved for appeal in a conditional plea agreement.”).
168. 645 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2011).
169. Id. at 860.
170. Id. at 861.
171. Id. at 862–63.
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vague in every application, which prevents a court from entering judgment
and obtaining a conviction under the statute. 172 By contrast, an as-applied
challenge only disputes the court’s ability to enter judgment and obtain a
conviction in the single case before it. 173 Even if the as-applied challenge is
successful, a court is not left without the power to bring other defendants
into court under the statute. 174 Thus, Phillips’s guilty plea barred him from
bringing an as-applied challenge on appeal. 175
In United States v. Seay, 176 Andrew Seay pleaded guilty to possession
of a firearm while unlawfully using a controlled substance. 177 The defendant appealed, claiming that the statute of conviction was facially unconstitutional. 178 The Eighth Circuit determined that a facial challenge is a jurisdictional claim because a court would not have the power to bring a defendant
into court under the statute. 179 Pursuant to the court’s holding, Seay was
permitted to bring his facial challenge. The analyses and general holdings
of the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuit are consistent with the above holdings
in Phillips and Seay, each maintaining that a facial constitutional challenge
is a jurisdictional defect not barred by a guilty plea.180 Together, these circuits compose the majority rule in the federal circuits.
The D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit, however, disagree with the
other federal circuits about the general rule that a facial constitutional challenge is not waived because it is a jurisdictional challenge. In United States
v. Baucum, 181 Patrick Baucum pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a school and then raised for the first time on appeal a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the criminal statute.182 The D.C.
Circuit recognized that several federal courts have treated facial constitutional claims as jurisdictional. 183 The court reasoned that even if the power
172. Id. at 863.
173. Id. (“[A] statute that is vague only as-applied to the defendant may still be constitutional
as-applied to others, and it thus does not strip the court of its power to enter a judgment under the
statute.”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
177. Id. at 920.
178. Id. at 922.
179. Id. at 923 (noting a facial challenge is a claim the government cannot constitutionally
prosecute the defendant under the statute).
180. See United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154 (10th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that
the defendant’s as-applied First Amendment challenge was barred by his guilty plea); United
States v. Urquilla-Avalos, 144 F. App’x 447, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2005) (asserting that a guilty plea
waives all non-jurisdictional defects and bars an as-applied constitutional challenge, but does not
waive a facial constitutional challenge); United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding that a facial vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect).
181. 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 540.
183. Id. at 542.
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to bring a defendant into court upon a charge does involve an issue of jurisdiction, “it does not follow that any facial constitutional challenge is also
jurisdictional.” 184 The court ultimately concluded that facial constitutional
challenges to presumptively valid statutes are non-jurisdictional and barred
by a guilty plea if the claims are raised for the first time on appeal. 185 The
court justified its holding with policy considerations of judicial efficiency
and finality of convictions. 186
Similarly, in United States v. Drew, 187 Wilbert Drew pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm and claimed for the first time on appeal that the
statute of conviction was facially unconstitutional. 188 Relying on Baucum,
the D.C. Circuit held that Drew’s facial challenge was barred because he
failed to raise the challenge in the lower court. 189 The Second Circuit took
lead from the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Feliciano 190 and held that
pursuant to Baucum, the defendants waived their facial constitutional challenges by failing to raise them in the court below. 191
The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, do not make any
meaningful distinction between facial and as-applied challenges. In United
States v. Manna, 192 Dahelak Manna pleaded guilty and brought an asapplied challenge to his statute of conviction. 193 The Third Circuit noted,
without emphasis, the as-applied nature of his claim and determined that his
guilty plea did not bar his as-applied challenge. 194 Permitting an as-applied
challenge in this context is contrary to the general rule among the federal
circuits that an as-applied challenge is waived by a guilty plea because it is
a non-jurisdictional claim. 195 Similarly, in United States v. Sandsness, 196
Michael Sandsness pleaded guilty to selling drug paraphernalia in interstate
commerce. 197 On appeal, Sandsness brought both facial and as-applied
184. Id. at 543.
185. Id. at 540.
186. Id. at 544.
187. 200 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 874.
189. Id. at 876.
190. 223 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2000).
191. Id. at 125 (“There is no reason why [the defendant’s] constitutional challenges could not
have been raised below, where he had ample opportunity to raise them and where the district court
would have had the opportunity to address them.”).
192. 92 F. App’x 880 (3d Cir. 2004).
193. Id. at 884.
194. Id. at 886, 886 n.6 (“Manna’s guilty plea does not foreclose his constitutional challenge
because the issue of a statute’s constitutionality ‘goes to the jurisdiction of the district court.’”
(quoting United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995))); see also United States v.
Whited, 311 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that a guilty plea did not bar the defendant’s claims without stamping any significance on the as-applied nature of one of the claims).
195. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
196. 988 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1992).
197. Id. at 970.
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challenges to the statute of conviction. 198 Before reaching the merits of his
claims, the Ninth Circuit determined the guilty plea did not bar either of
Sandsness’s claims because both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are jurisdictional and thus not waived by a guilty plea. 199 Lastly, in
Saac, four defendants brought a facial challenge to their statute of conviction. 200 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendants’ claim was not
barred because it was a jurisdictional challenge without any mention of
whether it was a facial or as-applied challenge. 201
The above discussion about the post-Broce development in the federal
circuits illustrates that the law regarding the preclusive effect of guilty pleas
is far from settled. Although there is some uniformity among the circuits
that consistently hold that a guilty plea is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional
claims, 202 there is still much variation in how the circuits apply Broce, interpret the breadth of the Menna-Blackledge exception, and distinguish between facial and as-applied challenges.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court directly addressed
“whether a guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal.” 203
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer stated a guilty plea does not bar a
claim that the statute is unconstitutional because it challenges the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute the defendant. 204 The Court began by noting that in Haynes v. United States, it held that a guilty plea does
not bar a constitutional claim, and that subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have offered a rationale for Haynes’s holding that applies to Class’s
claims. 205
The Court first discussed its holdings in Blackledge and Menna to illustrate that not all constitutional claims are barred by a guilty plea. 206 The
Court explained that the constitutional claim in Blackledge was not precluded because it implicated the power of the state to prosecute the defend-

198. Id.
199. Id. at 971 (“While a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects and fact issues, it
does not bar constitutional challenges.”).
200. United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011).
201. Id. at 1208; see supra notes 162–165 and accompanying text.
202. See supra Section II.D.2.
203. 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018).
204. Id. at 805 (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989)).
205. Id. at 803; see also supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s holding in Haynes).
206. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803–04.
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ant and asserted the right not to be brought into court upon the charge. 207
Observing that Menna repeated the holding and reasoning in Blackledge,
the Court restated its holding in Menna: A guilty plea does not waive a
claim that, “judged on its face,” the state cannot constitutionally prosecute
the charge. 208 The Court described the claim in Menna as a claim that the
state may not constitutionally convict the defendant even if factual guilt is
validly established. 209
After discussing the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, the Court found support for those holdings in early guilty plea jurisprudence. 210 According to
the Court, the holdings in Menna and Blackledge “reflect an understanding
of the nature of guilty pleas which, in broad outline, stretches back nearly
150 years.” 211 The Court pointed to several early state and federal cases
that held that a guilty plea did not waive constitutional claims or defective
indictment claims. 212
The Court noted it had “reaffirmed” and “refined [the] scope” of the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine in Broce. 213 The Court explained that the
Broce Court repeated the holdings of Blackledge and Menna but added that
a guilty plea waives a claim that cannot be proven without relying on the
existing record and without contradicting the indictment. 214 The Court distinguished Class’s claims from the claim in Broce. 215 Unlike Broce, Class’s
constitutional claims did not contradict the indictment or plea agreement.216
The Court asserted that Class’s Second Amendment and due process claims
were consistent with his admission of the allegations in the indictment and
could be resolved without looking at evidence beyond the existing record. 217
Additionally, the Court distinguished Class’s claims from the unconstitutional grand jury selection claim the Court faced in Tollett v. Henderson, reasoning that Class’s claims did not allege constitutional deprivations

207. Id. at 803 (noting the right accepted by the Court is the right not to be haled into court at
all upon the charge because “[t]he very initiation of the proceedings” against the defendant “operated to deprive him due process of law” (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974))).
208. Id. at 803–04 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam)).
209. Id. at 804 (citing Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 n.2).
210. Id.
211. Id. (noting in 1869, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that “if the facts
alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be discharged” (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869))).
212. Id.; see supra Section II.A (discussing the early guilty plea cases mentioned by the Court
in this part of the opinion).
213. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 804.
214. Id. (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 576 (1974)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575).
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that occurred prior to entering his guilty plea. 218 The Court explained that
unlike the claim in Tollett, Class’s claims could not be “‘cured’ through a
new indictment by a properly selected grand jury.” 219 The grand jury selection claim in Tollett was irrelevant to the validity of the conviction because
the defendant’s guilty plea admitted charges that constituted a crime. 220
Class’s guilty plea, however, did not render his claims irrelevant because he
asserted that the admitted conduct did not constitute a crime, which affected
the validity of Class’s conviction. 221 The Court ultimately held that a guilty
plea did not bar Class’s claims because it was not prohibited by his plea
agreement, and, like those made in Blackledge and Menna, Class’s claims
challenged the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute him. 222
The Court rejected each of the three arguments that the government
raised in support of its position that Class’s guilty plea barred his claims on
appeal. 223 First, the Court rejected the government’s contention that Class
“inherently relinquished his constitutional claims” by pleading guilty, determining that Class’s claims fell under the Menna-Blackledge doctrine. 224
Second, the Court rejected the argument that Rule 11(a)(2) 225 precludes a
defendant from bringing a claim that he failed to reserve in writing because
“the Rule itself does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for
a defendant to preserve a constitutional claim.” 226 Moreover, the Court recognized that the Rule is not applicable to claims that fall under the MennaBlackledge doctrine because the advisory committee notes expressly declare
Rule 11(a)(2) inapplicable to claims raised under the Menna-Blackledge
doctrine. 227 Lastly, the Court rejected the claim that Class expressly waived
his right to appeal when Class agreed to the district court judge’s verbal
statement that he was giving up his right to appeal his conviction. 228 The
Court reasoned that the statement was made to ensure that Class understood
the terms of his plea agreement and did not expressly refer to a waiver of
the right to appeal at issue. 229
218. Id. at 804–05 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)).
219. Id. at 805 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 805–06 (“[L]ike the defendants in Blackledge and Menna, [Class] seeks to raise a
claim which, ‘judged on its face’ based upon the existing record, would extinguish the government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ the defendant if the claim were successful.” (quoting
Broce, 488 U.S. at 575)).
225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2); see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
226. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806.
227. Id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments (recognizing the Rule does not apply to claims that fall within the Menna-Blackledge doctrine).
228. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
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In his dissent, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice
Kennedy, argued that the majority was incorrect because Rule 11 should
have governed Class’s claims and criticized the majority’s decision for
leaving the law in a disordered state.230 Contrary to the majority’s holding,
Justice Alito determined that Rule 11 clearly states, with one exception, an
unconditional guilty plea is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional claims. 231
Although not exactly stated in the Rule, Justice Alito reasoned that a waiver
of all non-jurisdictional claims is implied by the text of the Rule and the
advisory committee’s notes state that an unconditional plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects. 232 The exception that Justice Alito referred to is the
Menna-Blackledge doctrine. 233 Although Justice Alito recognized that Rule
11(a)(2) is not applicable to the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, he viewed
Blackledge and Menna as “marked departures” from the Court’s prior decisions. 234 Justice Alito criticized the holdings of Blackledge and Menna at
length, claiming that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine “is vacuous, has no
sound foundation, and produces nothing but confusion.” 235
Justice Alito declared that Broce “essentially repudiated” the theories
offered in Blackledge and Menna. 236 According to Justice Alito, Broce explicitly disavowed Menna’s proposition that a guilty plea admits only factual guilt by explaining that an unconditional plea admits “all of the factual
and legal elements” necessary to obtain a binding conviction. 237 Regarding
Blackledge, Justice Alito reasoned that Broce rejected the idea that a right
not to be tried survives a guilty plea by holding that the defendants’ right to
bring a double jeopardy claim was eliminated by their guilty pleas.238
Justice Alito asserted that instead of clarifying the law, the majority’s
opinion added confusion by reiterating unintelligible catchphrases from
Blackledge without adding any clarity to their meaning. 239 Justice Alito also criticized the majority for repeating Menna’s proposition that only
claims which contradict the allegations in the indictment are waived by a
guilty plea. 240 Justice Alito claimed such a holding would allow defendants
to raise “an uncertain assortment of claims never before thought to survive a

230. Id. at 807, 816 (Alito, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 808.
232. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendments).
233. Id. at 809.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 816.
236. Id. at 813.
237. Id. (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)); see Broce, 488 U.S. at
570 (“By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discrete acts
described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.”).
238. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 813 (Alito, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 814.
240. Id.
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guilty plea.” 241 Finally, Justice Alito declared that the majority incorrectly
sought support for its opinion in early guilty plea jurisprudence. 242 Justice
Alito characterized Haynes as “irrelevant for present purposes” because the
government did not argue that the defendant’s plea barred his constitutional
claim. 243 Likewise, Justice Alito stated that Commonwealth v. Hinds was
unhelpful to the resolution of this case because it only reflects the idea that
a post-guilty plea defendant can assert jurisdictional defects.244 Justice
Alito concluded his dissent by reiterating his belief that Rule 11 governed
Class’s case and noted he would have limited the Menna-Blackledge doctrine “to the particular types of claims involved in those cases.”245
IV. ANALYSIS
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea
does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such a claim does not contradict a
defendant’s admissions and challenges the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute them. 246 The Court’s holding was ultimately correct because the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applied to Class’s claims and its holding is consistent with Broce: Class’s claims challenged the government’s
power to constitutionally convict him, his claims do not contradict the conduct admitted in his guilty plea, and it is not necessary to venture beyond
the existing record to prove his claims. 247 The Court’s holding is also compatible with the text of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
because nothing in the Rule indicates that a constitutional challenge is
waived if it is not reserved through a conditional plea. 248 Additionally, the
holding was appropriate because Rule 11(a)(2)’s extension of the right to
enter a conditional plea does not sufficiently protect the procedural right of
post-guilty plea defendants to bring constitutional claims. 249 Further, the
Court properly balanced the government’s interest in the finality of guilty
pleas and the conservation of judicial resources with defendants’ interest in
asserting certain values protected by the constitution and in being free from
unjustified punishment. 250 The Court’s reasoning was flawed, however, be241. Id.
242. Id. at 815.
243. Id. (explaining how allowing a constitutional claim when the government does not assert
the plea as a bar does not provide any insight about what should happen when the government,
like in Class, does argue the guilty plea bars the constitutional claim).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 816.
246. Id. at 804–05 (majority opinion).
247. See infra Section IV.A.
248. See infra Section IV.B.
249. See infra Section IV.C.
250. See infra Section IV.D.
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cause the Court neglected to discuss the distinction between jurisdictional
and non-jurisdictional claims and facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. 251 As a result, the Court failed to generally clarify the law and did
not utilize this opportunity to promote uniformity in the federal circuits. 252
A. The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because the Menna-Blackledge
Doctrine Is Applicable to Class’s Claim and Is Consistent with
Broce
The Court’s conclusion that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine applies to
a criminal defendant’s constitutional challenge to their statute of conviction
was correct. 253 Similar to the claims in Blackledge and Menna, Class’s
claim that his statute of conviction was unconstitutional challenges the government’s authority to constitutionally prosecute him. 254 A guilty plea does
not constitute a concession that the state may constitutionally proscribe
conduct alleged in the indictment. 255 Rather, a guilty plea establishes factual guilt—that the defendant did, in fact, engage in the conduct alleged in the
indictment. 256 If a statute is found unconstitutional, the state may not constitutionally prosecute the defendant because the admitted conduct is noncriminal, meaning the defendant essentially pleaded guilty to no crime at
all. 257 The Menna-Blackledge doctrine thus applies to Class’s claim because, if his claim is successful, the government cannot constitutionally
prosecute Class for innocent conduct.
The Court’s holding is also consistent with its holding in Broce. 258
Broce reaffirmed and placed limitations on the Menna-Blackledge doctrine
by expressly requiring that defendants must be able to prove their claim by
relying on the existing record and without contradicting the conduct alleged
and admitted in the indictment. 259 The Broce Court found that the Menna251. See infra Section IV.E.
252. See infra Section IV.E.
253. Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018).
254. Id.
255. Hannah Roberts, Comment, Rethinking the Effects of a Guilty Plea on the Right to Challenge One’s Statute of Conviction, 26 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 631 (2017).
256. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).
257. See United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that Seay’s claim
that the statute of conviction was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment was not
barred by his guilty plea because, if correct, the government had no power to bring him into court
at all); Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283, 289 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that Journigan’s claim that
the statute of conviction was unconstitutional was not barred by his guilty plea because such a
claim “goes to the very authority of the state to hale him into court”); see also Roberts, supra note
255, at 631 (“If it is determined upon review that the state has no authority to punish that conduct,
the defendant is essentially innocent of wrongdoing, regardless of the plea she entered.”).
258. See supra notes 125–130 and accompanying text (discussing Broce’s holding).
259. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1988) (recognizing Blackledge and
Menna established “[a]n exception to the rule barring collateral attack on a guilty plea” but finding
the exception was not applicable to the case at bar); United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141,
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Blackledge doctrine was not applicable because the defendants’ claim could
not be proved without contradicting the indictments and venturing beyond
the existing record. 260 The Broce defendants pleaded guilty to two separate
conspiracy indictments, then later claimed that only one conspiracy existed. 261 Such an assertion directly contradicts the charges in the indictment
that the defendants admitted and necessarily involves relying on information other than the existing record. Unlike the claim in Broce, Class’s
claims that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional did not deny that
he engaged in the alleged and admitted conduct. 262 Class maintained that
he engaged in the alleged conduct and simply claimed that the government
may not constitutionally convict him based on such conduct. 263 Class’s
claims, therefore, are distinct from the claim in Broce and are wholly consistent with the limitations that Broce placed on the Menna-Blackledge exception.
B. The Court’s Holding Is Compatible with Rule 11
The Court’s holding is compatible with Rule 11 as well. Although
Rule 11(a)(2) allows defendants to preserve certain rights on appeal by entering a conditional plea, 264 nothing in the text of the Rule suggests that
challenges to a statute’s constitutionality are waived if not reserved by a
conditional plea. 265 Moreover, Rule 11(b)(1), 266 which sets forth the factors
1151 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting the Supreme Court “imposed some limits on Blackledge and Menna” in Broce); Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2028 (2000) (“Endeavoring to
cabin the decisions in Blackledge and Menna without overruling them, the Court in Broce recognized a limited jurisdictional exception to the general rule against collateral challenges ‘where on
the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence,’ but
found it inapplicable to claims of double jeopardy.” (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 569)). Contra
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 813 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (claiming Broce “repudiated the theories offered” in Blackledge and Menna).
260. Broce, 488 U.S. at 575–76 (noting Blackledge and Menna were resolved without any
need to venture beyond the existing record). In Blackledge, the concessions implicit in the defendant’s guilty plea were irrelevant because the constitutional infirmity in the proceedings lay in
the State’s power to bring any indictment at all. Id. In Menna, the indictment was facially duplicative of the earlier offense of which the defendant had been convicted and sentenced, so the admissions made by Menna’s guilty plea could not conceivably be construed to extend beyond a
redundant confession to the earlier offense. Id.
261. Id. at 565.
262. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.
263. Id. at 805–06 (“[Class] seeks to raise a claim which, ‘judged on its face’ based upon the
existing record, would extinguish the government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ the defendant if the claim were successful.” (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575)).
264. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2).
265. Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
In Support of Petitioner at 20, Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (No. 16-424) [hereinafter Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers]; see Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806
(stating that “the Rule itself does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for a defendant to preserve a constitutional claim”).
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that courts must convey to defendants before they enter a guilty plea, does
not clearly state that by accepting a guilty plea a defendant waives the right
to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.267 As a result,
issues regarding the intelligent nature of guilty pleas could arise if Rule 11
was interpreted as barring claims that challenge the constitutionality of the
statute of conviction. 268 Because Rule 11 does not require the court to explicitly notify defendants that their guilty plea waives the right to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute, the plea may not be intelligently made
for purposes of waiving that right. 269
C. The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because Rule 11(a)(2) Provides
Inadequate Protection of Defendants’ Procedural Rights
The opportunity for defendants to enter into conditional guilty pleas
pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) does not function as an effective way for defendants to preserve certain rights on appeal. 270 A defendant must overcome
numerous hurdles to obtain a conditional plea. The Rule only allows defendants to enter into conditional guilty pleas with the consent of the court
and the government. 271 A defendant, therefore, has the obstacle of obtaining consent from the prosecutor before a claim can be reserved for appeal. 272 Prosecutors have broad discretion and may withhold such consent
for any reason or for no reason at all. 273 Further, courts are not obligated to
accept guilty pleas. 274

266. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). The court, before accepting a guilty plea, must inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands a number of factors, including:
(A) the government’s right . . . to use against the defendant any statement that the defendant gives under oath; (B) the right to plead not guilty . . .; (C) the right to a jury trial; (D) the right to be represented by counsel . . .; (E) the right at trial to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses . . .; (F) the defendant’s waiver of these trial rights if
the court accepts a plea of guilty . . .; (N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence . . . .
Id.
267. Id.; Roberts, supra note 255, at 641.
268. Roberts, supra note 255, at 642.
269. Id.
270. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 19. Contra Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 808 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Class
and similarly situated defendants can enter into a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)).
271. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (“With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . reserving in writing the right to have an appellate
court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on
appeal may then withdraw the plea.”).
272. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 20.
273. Id. (citing United States v. Fisher, 772 F.2d 371, 374 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)).
274. Id. at 21 (“Even a ‘blanket prohibition’ on the entry of all conditional pleas may not ‘constitute error in any given case.’” (quoting United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1527–28 (10th
Cir. 1990))).
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Prosecutors have numerous incentives for obtaining guilty pleas. 275
Guilty pleas can help prosecutors advance their careers by allowing prosecutors to handle more cases and boost their conviction rates. 276 Prosecutors
also use plea bargains to conserve resources and to protect their conviction
rates. 277 Prosecutors, therefore, often require specific waivers of certain
rights before they will accept a plea agreement.278
In addition to these prosecutorial incentives, prosecutors have immense bargaining power in plea bargaining negotiations that allow them to
easily obtain guilty pleas. 279 The broad and powerful prosecutorial discretion in making a plea bargain is used to persuade defendants into pleading
guilty instead of facing severe sentences. 280 Prosecutors use the nature of
the crime to leverage their position in plea bargaining negotiations. 281 Additionally, “[p]rosecutors have virtually unchecked discretion to charge
more- or less-serious penalties for the same act.” 282 Prosecutors can also
penalize defendants for refusing plea offers by “adding enhancements or
charges,” which can add significant time to a defendant’s sentence if convicted. 283 These prosecutorial incentives, combined with the immense bargaining power that prosecutors have in plea bargaining negotiations, can
make it very difficult for defendants to obtain conditional pleas. 284 Essentially, “the prosecutors hold all the cards” in plea bargaining negotiations. 285

275. F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent:
The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 191
(2002).
276. Id. at 191–92.
277. Derek Teeter, Comment, A Contracts Analysis of Waivers of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Plea Bargains, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 737–38 (2005).
278. Id.
279. Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of
Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 598 (2014) (“In the context of plea bargaining,
power imbalances are built into the structure of the system.” (citing Michael M. O’Hear, Plea
Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 425 (2008)); Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 194.
280. Boaz Sangero, Safety From Plea Bargains’ Hazards, 38 PACE L. REV. 301, 316 (2018).
281. Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 194 (“[T]he more horrible the crime, the longer
the sentence, and the greater likelihood of a lesser included offense.”).
282. Alkon, supra note 279, at 582 (citing MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 87 (2012)).
283. Id. The additional charges and enhancements simply have to be “at least arguably supported by evidence.” Id. at 598.
284. See id. at 582–83 (noting that “prosecutors are rarely hesitant to wield [their] power” to
convince defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the risk of an even longer sentence).
285. Id. at 599.
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D. The Court Properly Balanced the Competing Interests of the
Parties
The Court’s holding struck a proper balance between the competing
interests of the government and defendants. The government has an interest
in maintaining the finality of convictions 286 and conserving judicial and
prosecutorial resources. 287 Guilty pleas ensure that courts operate efficiently by reducing the number of cases that go to trial and by reducing the time
and resources that prosecutors would otherwise dedicate to trials.288 By
contrast, defendants have an interest in “asserting the values protected by
the particular constitutional defense at issue,” 289 in limiting their probable
sentence, 290 and in not being unjustly punished by the state. 291
As demonstrated in Section IV.C., the plea-bargaining system favors
the interests of prosecutors over the interests of defendants because of the
disparity in bargaining power. 292 Because prosecutors often demand specific waivers of rights and claims 293 and threaten to penalize defendants with
increased charges and sentencing if they do not plead guilty, 294 prosecutors
have a coercive effect on defendants when they enter into plea agreements. 295 While this prosecutorial power certainly promotes efficiency and
finality of convictions, it fails to promote defendants’ interest in asserting
constitutional values and in being free from unjust punishment. 296 This
power imbalance thus benefits the interests of prosecutors to the detriment
of defendants’ interests.
By upholding the validity of Class’s constitutional challenges in the
face of a guilty plea, 297 the Court helped level the playing field in the pleabargaining arena. 298 The Court, in so holding, effectively concluded that

286. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970).
287. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
288. Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 191 (asserting prosecutors are able to handle
more cases and increase their conviction rate by obtaining guilty pleas).
289. Peter Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1238 (1977).
290. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752.
291. Roberts, supra note 255, at 627 (stating defendants have an “interest in being free from
punishment”).
292. Alkon, supra note 279, at 598–99; see supra notes 279–285 and accompanying text.
293. Teeter, supra note 277, at 737–38 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 22 n.4 (1st
Cir. 2001)).
294. See Alkon, supra note 279, at 582.
295. Hessick III & Saujani, supra note 275, at 189 (“Scholars have also attacked plea bargaining on the ground the prosecutors wield too much power over defendants and coerce them into
accepting plea agreements which might be unfair.”).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 289–291.
297. Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 807 (2018).
298. See supra notes 279–285 and accompanying text (describing the great bargaining power
prosecutors wield in plea negotiations).
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Class’s interest in asserting his constitutional values and in potentially being free from punishment outweighed the government’s interest in finality
and conservation of resources. 299 The Court correctly granted the defendant’s interest more weight in this context because the government has no
interest in punishing constitutionally protected conduct.300 Allowing statutes that criminalize protected conduct to go unchallenged “enables [the
government] to circumvent the substantive protections provided by the constitution in favor of preserving an illegitimate [governmental] interest.” 301
Although substantial, the state’s interest in finality is irrelevant when the
Constitution does not permit the state to proscribe certain conduct. 302 Because Class’s claims alleged that his conviction violated constitutional protections, the Court rightly overrode the government’s interest in finality.
It is true, as suggested by Justice Alito, that the Court’s holding will
place a burden on the government to defend the constitutionality of its statutes, which harms the government’s interest in conserving resources. 303
However, just as the state’s interest in finality must yield to the defendant’s
liberty interest, 304 the state must likewise bear the burden of defending a
statute’s constitutionality to ensure that the statute has not criminalized protected conduct. 305 Going forward, governmental resources may be less
strained because nothing in the Court’s holding suggests that a prosecutor
may not obtain a waiver of the procedural right to bring a constitutional
claim on appeal from defendants. 306 In fact, the Court’s opinion may be
read as indirectly implying that prosecutors may obtain a waiver of the right
to challenge a statute’s constitutionality because the Court importantly noted that Class’s plea agreement did not include an explicit waiver of that
right. 307
E. The Court Failed to Promote Uniformity in the Federal Circuits
Several federal circuits have based their holdings regarding the rights
of post-guilty plea defendants on the distinction between jurisdictional and

299. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807.
300. Roberts, supra note 255, at 630 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731
(2016)).
301. Id. (citing Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729–30, which noted convictions under an unconstitutional statute are unlawful).
302. Id. at 627 (citing Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732).
303. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 814 (Alito, J., dissenting); Roberts, supra note 255, at 631.
304. See supra notes 300–302 and accompanying text (explaining the state’s interest in finality is irrelevant if the state criminalizes constitutionally protected conduct).
305. Roberts, supra note 255, at 631–32 (citing United States v. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715, 726 (1971)).
306. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 265, at 21–22.
307. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802 (majority opinion) (“The [plea] agreement said nothing about the
right to raise on direct appeal a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.”).
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non-jurisdictional claims and as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, while other circuits have not. 308 The majority of federal circuits found
this distinction meaningful when applying the Menna-Blackledge doctrine,
holding that the Menna-Blackledge doctrine does not apply to as-applied
constitutional challenges because it does not prohibit the government from
obtaining convictions under the statute against other individuals.309 In
Class, however, the Court failed to explicitly base any part of its reasoning
on whether Class’s claims were as-applied or facial constitutional challenges. 310 As a result, the Court’s decision did not resolve the federal circuits’
inconsistent treatment of post-guilty plea appeals, nor did it provide any
guidance that might shed light on the issue. 311 Inconsistency among the circuits is problematic because whether a criminal defendant may appeal after
pleading guilty is contingent on the charging jurisdiction and the law followed therein. 312 This lack of uniformity is also contrary to one of the primary functions of the courts: “uniformity in the interpretation of substantive
law.” 313
To put an end to the inconsistent application of the law in the federal
circuits, the Court should have addressed the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims and between facial and as-applied challenges. 314 Though few federal circuits have addressed the preclusive effect
of guilty pleas since Class, it is clear that addressing those distinctions
would have been helpful because post-Class cases in the Eleventh Circuit
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit continue to
308. See supra Section II.D.3 (discussing the distinction between as-applied and facial constitutional challenges in the federal circuits).
309. See United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] statute that is vague
[and, therefore, unconstitutional] only as-applied to the defendant may still be constitutional asapplied to others, and it thus does not strip the court of its power to enter a judgment under the
statute or deprive the government of authority to seek a conviction under the statute. Stated otherwise, an as-applied challenge . . . will not leave the court without any power to hale a defendant
into court under the statute”).
310. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803 (stating the issue as simply whether a guilty plea bars Class from
“challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction” without making a distinction between as-applied or facial constitutional challenges).
311. See supra Section II.D (discussing the inconsistent application of the law in the federal
circuits).
312. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L. J. 315, 378 n.383 (2011) (“The argument for uniformity is,
of course, well tread in the substantive law context. Many scholars argue that citizens of different
jurisdictions should not be subjected to different interpretations of the same law.”).
313. Id. at 378 (citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994)) (noting “one of the primary functions of courts is to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of substantive law” and “federal rules exist to ensure uniformity in procedure” (first citing Caminker, supra, at 38; then citing
Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV.
757, 757 (1995)).
314. See supra Section II.D (illustrating the inconsistent application of the law to post-guilty
plea claims in the federal circuits).
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speak in terms of jurisdiction. 315 In United States v. Thomas, 316 the Eleventh Circuit added jurisdictional language into Class’s holding and categorized Class as sanctioning jurisdictional claims but barring nonjurisdictional claims. 317 In United States v. St. Hubert, 318 the Eleventh Circuit, citing Class as partial support, concluded that Michael St. Hubert’s
guilty plea did not waive his jurisdictional claim on appeal. 319 Likewise, in
United States v. Rush, 320 the Fourth Circuit cited Class as support for its
conclusion that Christopher Rush waived his right to challenge the court’s
rulings on his pretrial motions because such a claim is a non-jurisdictional
defect. 321
The federal circuits, with a history of applying the distinction between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims, will likely continue to ground
their analyses in the jurisdictional nature of claims because the Class Court
failed to articulate a clear rule that would promote uniformity. 322 The Court
had an opportunity to address the preclusive effect of guilty pleas for the
first time in almost thirty years, yet failed to add clarity to this area of law,
maintaining the long-held lack of uniformity. 323
The Court should have issued an opinion aligned with the post-Broce
majority framework in the federal circuits and adopted the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional defects and as-applied and facial
constitutional challenges. 324 The distinction provides a clear general rule

315. See United States v. Thomas, No. 17-12665, 2018 WL 3911770, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 15,
2018) (making a distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional claims).
316. No. 17-12665, 2018 WL 3911770 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018).
317. Id. at *3–4 (asserting that Class reviewed the types of non-jurisdictional claims barred by
a guilty plea and citing Class as support for its holding that Joseph Leroy Thomas’s nonjurisdictional claims were barred).
318. 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018).
319. Id. at 343–44 (“[W]hile the Supreme Court in Class did not speak in terms of jurisdiction
or jurisdictional indictment defects, it suggested . . . that a claim that the facts alleged in the indictment and admitted by the defendant do not constitute a crime at all cannot be waived by a defendant’s guilty plea because that kind of claim challenges the district court’s power to act.” (citing Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018))). The court determined that Class thus
supported the jurisdictional claim case law in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 344.
320. 740 F. App’x 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
321. Id. at 282 (“[B]ecause a valid guilty plea waives all prior, nonjurisdictional defects in a
criminal proceeding, we conclude that Rush has waived his right to challenge the propriety of the
court’s rulings on his pretrial motions.” (citing Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805)).
322. See supra notes 315–321 and accompanying text; see also Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (stating it is “unclear” how the rules listed by the majority fit together). Justice
Alito also criticized the rule that a claim survives a guilty plea if it challenges the state’s power to
constitutionally prosecute the defendant as “no more intelligible now than it was when first incanted in Blackledge.” Id. at 814.
323. See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There is no justification for the muddle left by [the majority’s] decision.”).
324. See supra Section II.D.3 (discussing the distinction between as-applied and facial constitutional challenges).
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for determining whether a defendant’s claim is barred or falls within the
Menna-Blackledge exception 325 and is consistent with the underlying logic
of the doctrine. 326 As summarized by the Seventh Circuit: “[A]n as-applied
challenge is a non-jurisdictional issue because, even if the challenge is successful, it will not leave the court without any power to hale a defendant into court under the statute.” 327 A facial challenge is a jurisdictional defect
because, if the challenge is successful, “it is by definition [unconstitutional]
in every application, preventing a court from entering a judgment under the
statute in any case and stripping the government of its ability to obtain a
conviction against any defendant.” 328 Thus, adopting a rule based on this
distinction is consistent with the Menna-Blackledge doctrine because a
claim that does “not leave a court without any power to bring a defendant
into court under the statute” does not fall within the Menna-Blackledge exception. 329 Although as-applied and facial constitutional challenges were
not clearly presented by Class’s claims, the Court should have used this opportunity to provide as much guidance and clarity as possible in furtherance
of promoting uniform law in the federal circuits.
V. CONCLUSION
In Class v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea
does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction because such a claim does not contradict
the defendant’s admissions and challenges the government’s power to constitutionally prosecute the defendant. 330 The Court correctly applied the
Menna-Blackledge exception to Class’s claims because a claim that a statute is unconstitutional challenges the power of the government to constitutionally convict the defendant under that statute, and the Court’s holding
was consistent with Broce because Class’s claims do not contradict the
conduct admitted in his guilty plea. 331 Further, the holding was consistent
with Rule 11 because Rule 11(a)(2) does not set forth the exclusive procedure for a post-guilty plea defendant to bring a claim on appeal. 332 The
Court also properly protected defendants’ important procedural rights because the option to enter a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) is an
insufficient protection given the immense bargaining power of prosecutors
325. See United States v. Phillips, 645 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating an as-applied
challenge is a non-jurisdictional issue and is thus waived by entry of a guilty plea).
326. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (holding that a claim is not barred if it
involves the defendant’s claimed right not to be haled into court at all).
327. Phillips, 645 F.3d at 863.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804–05 (2018).
331. See supra Section IV.A.
332. See supra Section IV.B.
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in plea negotiations. 333 Moreover, the Court properly balanced the competing interests at stake by effectively holding that the government has no interest in punishing constitutionally protected conduct. 334 The Court, however, failed to address the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims and facial and as-applied challenges. 335 Accordingly,
the Court did not articulate a rule that would promote clarity and uniformity
in the federal circuits. 336 To clean the murky waters of guilty plea jurisprudence, the Court should have adopted the distinction between jurisdictional
and non-jurisdictional defects and facial and as-applied challenges. 337 This
lack of guidance from the Supreme Court may leave the waters cloudy for
many years into the future.

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.E.
See supra Section IV.E.
See supra Section IV.E.

